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1ARTICLE X:  NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
by Graham S. Pearson*  & Nicholas A Sims†
Introduction
1.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) is considering measures to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally binding instrument.   It is evident that
the implementation of a legally binding instrument will require States Parties to take
appropriate national measures.   Consequently, Article X National Implementation Measures
of the draft Protocol is of vital importance in ensuring that the future Protocol achieves its
objective of strengthening the BTWC.    Previous Briefing Papers No 4 and No 14 have
considered national implementation measures1 and recommended strengthening these in a
number of ways.
2.   The Ad Hoc Group has made good progress in its consideration of Article X National
Implementation Measures  and the current rolling text contains language which is relatively
mature and has only 10 pairs of square brackets.   It is therefore timely to evaluate the current
state of this Article.
Article X




1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any
necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Protocol. [In particular, it
shall:
[(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any
other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from
undertaking any activity prohibited [to a State Party] under the Convention [,
including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity];]
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2[(b) Prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity
anywhere under its control; and]
[(c) Prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing
its nationality from undertaking any activity anywhere prohibited under the
Convention.]]
2. Each State Party may, where requested, cooperate with other States Parties and
afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the
obligations under paragraph 1.
3. In order to fulfill its obligations under this Protocol, each State Party shall
designate or set up a [National Authority] and shall so inform the Organization upon
entry into force of this Protocol for it. The [National Authority] shall serve as the
national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.
4. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and
administrative measures taken pursuant to this Article.
5. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Protocol,
shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of people and to protect the
environment, and may cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this
regard.
6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of
all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical [Secretariat]
[Body].
Evaluation
4.   This language closely parallels, as might be expected, that in Article VII of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC)3:
ARTICLE VI I     NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
General undertakings
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt
the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention. In
particular, it shall:
(a)Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other
place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from
undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention,
including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;
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3(b)Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State
Party under this Convention; and
(c)Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by
natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international
law.
2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the
appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the
obligations under paragraph 1.
3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this
Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to
protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States
Parties in this regard.
Relations between the State Party and the Organization
4. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall
designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for
effective liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each State Party
shall notify the Organization of its National Authority at the time that this Convention
enters into force for it.
5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and
administrative measures taken to implement this Convention.
6. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to
information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in
connection with the implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such information
and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this
Convention and in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality
Annex.
7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the
exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical
Secretariat.
5.  There are, however, differences.   The most significant of these relates to the requirement
to enact penal legislation.  Article X in paragraph 1 currently has the language relating to
enacting penal legislation within square brackets although it is clear, as we have argued in
Briefing Papers No 4 and 14, that penal legislation is required to ensure that there is uniform
strengthening of the Convention by all States Parties to the Protocol.
6.   The experience of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in
its monitoring of the implementation of Article VII of the CWC is instructive and
informative.  At the third session of the Conference of States Parties on 16 - 20 November
41998, the Director- General of the OPCW noted4 that "The Chemical Weapons Convention is
not self-executing.  Each State Party's international obligations under the Convention must
be given direct internal legal effect.".    He went on to state that "more than 18 months after
entry into force of the Convention, out of 119 States Parties, only 40, i.e. only 33%, have
informed the technical Secretariat of the legal and administrative measures they have taken
to implement the Convention....of those texts submitted and reviewed, only 26 appear to be
comprehensive enough for the State Party to be able to implement the Convention effectively
in its jurisdiction.  In only 18 of those texts has the penal legislation been extended to
nationals extraterritorially, as required by Article VII, subparagraph 1 (c)."  Details are
provided in a survey5 of national implementing legislation prepared by the Office of the Legal
Adviser of the OPCW.
7.  The lesson to be derived from this experience is that the enactment of national penal
legislation to implement the CWC is a gradual process, which some States Parties have
completed faster than others.  However, because the obligation to enact penal legislation is
clearly required by the CWC it is possible for the OPCW to measure national performance
against the requirements of the Convention and to draw the attention of States Parties to what
remains to be done in the implementation on Article VII of the CWC.
8.   Our view is that Article X of the Protocol needs to contain the requirement for enactment
of penal legislation.  As we have pointed out previously, this recommendation is based on the
past 25 years' experience with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which in
Article IV requires that:
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development,
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.
However, it is apparent from the successive Review Conferences that there is considerable
variation in the measures taken by individual States Parties and it is far from clear that all
States Parties have indeed taken necessary measures.    As the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group
is to devise a regime to "strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the
Convention"  the opportunity should be taken to ensure that States Parties do indeed enact
appropriate legislation.   Such legislation, vigorously implemented by police and by the
security and other agencies of governments, is also required nationally to deter terrorists from
seeking to acquire biological weapons and to prosecute any infringements.
9.   The requirement for penal legislation in this Protocol does not intrude upon national
sovereignty any more than does the equivalent language in Article VII paragraph 1 (a) of the
CWC.  In neither case is a penalty specified.   The text does not even "mention the kind of
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5penal sanctions required."  6   States Parties are free to decide that and other elements of their
national legislation for themselves.
10.   In this regard the Protocol follows the pattern of the varied national legislation which has
been enacted in accordance with Article IV of the BTWC.   Two of the earliest responses to
the obligation flowing from Article IV exemplify this diversity, in specifying very different
maximum penalties.   The United Kingdom's Biological Weapons Act  of 8 February 1974
allows offenders convicted under the Act7  to be sentenced to life imprisonment -- that is, a
sentence of indefinite duration which at the extreme becomes imprisonment for the prisoner's
whole life -- in addition to an unlimited fine. Belgium's equivalent law8, of 10 July 1978,
provides for a term of imprisonment with a minimum of eight days and a maximum of one
year, and limits any fine imposed to a maximum of 100,000 francs.   It was explained9 that
this wide range in the permissible range of penalties, which is usual in the criminal law of
Belgium, is intended to allow the greatest possible discretion to the court in sentencing an
offender.  Nevertheless, the permissible range is rather narrow in comparison with that
available to a British court under the 1974 legislation.   On the other hand, Belgium's law
provides explicitly for confiscation of the prohibited objects, on which the United Kingdom's
law is silent.   So it is emphatically not a case of dividing national legislation into 'strong' and
'weak'.   Each of the States Parties in this example has fulfilled the requirement of Article IV,
but each reflects its national practice and legal tradition in the substance of penal legislation.
11.   The penal legislation to be adopted in accordance with Article X of the Protocol --
assuming that the square brackets are removed -- can equally vary between national contexts
for the imposition of penalties.  Article IV, with its recognition that constitutional processes
differ from one country to another, is consistent with this approach in the Protocol.    Both are
fully respectful of sovereignty, while insistent on effective implementation.   The history of
the BTWC shows, through successive Review Conferences and now the work of the AHG, a
steadily deepening entrenchment of Article IV as the importance of national implementation
regulating the behaviour of individuals comes to be more fully recognized even if not
sufficiently acted upon10.
12.  What matters is that the person committing "any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention"  is liable to punishment under the laws of States Parties.   It is
difficult to see how national implementation could still be effective if it fails to include such
provision for punishment.
13.  The idea of requiring national penal legislation to reinforce international treaty
constraints is not a new one in the field of chemical and biological weapons.   Leaving aside
the history of Article IV of the BTWC, which as outlined above generated penal legislation as
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6early as the 1970s, the idea was taken forward into the negotiation of the CWC in the 1980s,
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VII.
14.   A working paper11 in 1985 by the German Democratic Republic contained a section
entitled 'Guidelines for a National System for the Implementation of a Chemical Weapons
Convention'  which included the statement that "Each State Party should establish directly
binding norms with sanctions or penalties for non-compliance."    It was considered by the
authors of this proposal that only if States Parties took such action could the chemical
weapons activities of individuals be universally proscribed as criminal, in support of the
treaty obligations binding upon their Governments.12  CD/620 is significant as the working
paper out of which the main elements of the eventual Article VII emerged.
 15.   By the time of the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons which
took place in September 1989 in Canberra, Australia, there was a widespread acceptance13 of
the need for all persons under the jurisdiction and control of a State Party to be obliged by a
generally binding norm to fulfil the main obligations of the CWC as contained in Article I
and that this included the requirement "to enact also law enforcement measures, among them
criminal penalties."   It was further noted that "[It should be acknowledged that the purview
of these norms needs to be extended to all citizens of a State Party, irrespective of their
country of residence.   This will be an element conducive to achieving the global
implementation of the Convention.]"
16.  Penal legislation explicitly entered the rolling text of the CWC during negotiations in the
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as expressed in its report14 to the Conference on
Disarmament in January 1991:
Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the
necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention, and, in
particular:
(a) to prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in other
places under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from
undertaking any activity that a State Party to this Convention is prohibited
from undertaking by this Convention;
(b)  not to permit any activity as referred to under (a) in any place under its
control;  and
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7(c) to enact penal legislation, which shall extend to any such activities as
referred to under (a) undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its
nationality, in conformity with international law. [Emphasis added]
17.   All the elements are there which eventually ended up, in almost identical language, as
paragraph 1 of Article VII of the CWC (reproduced in paragraph 4 above of this Evaluation
Paper), although it is to be noted that in the final text of the CWC the enactment obligation --
"including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity"  -- was added at the end of
subparagraph (a), with the extension of that enacted penal legislation retained in
subparagraph (c).
18.   Finally, it should be noted that if the words "including enacting penal legislation with
respect to such activity"  are excluded from Article X of the Protocol, which in the rest of its
language quite closely follows the wording of Article VII of the CWC, there would be scope
for invidious comparison.   It will all too readily be concluded that the prevention of illegal
activity involving biological and toxin weapons demands a less stringent and punitive
approach than the prevention of illegal activity involving chemical weapons.   This would be
a most regrettable misapprehension as there is little doubt that biological weapons present an
even greater potential threat.   This misperception can easily be prevented by removing the
square brackets and thereby ensuring that penal legislation is required to implement the
Protocol -- or in other words, that a failure by an individual of the State Party to comply with
the Protocol is a punishable offence.
19.  Although our earlier recommendations15 for strengthening Article X are still valid, it
appears that the AHG does not wish to incorporate the modest amendments which would
significantly improve the effectiveness of the Protocol.   The other differences between the
Article X language and the CWC language are relatively minor.  It is, however, important that
the square brackets surrounding subparagraphs 1 (a), (b) and (c) are removed.
Strike-through text for Article X
20.  Our view is that Article X should be further developed by the removal of the remaining




1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any
necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Protocol. [In particular, it
shall:
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8[(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any
other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from
undertaking any activity prohibited [ to a State Party] under the Convention [,
including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity ] ;  ]
[(b) Prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity
anywhere under its control; and ]
[(c) Prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing
its nationality from undertaking any activity anywhere prohibited under the
Convention.]]
2. Each State Party may, where requested, cooperate with other States Parties and
afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the
obligations under paragraph 1.
3. In order to fulfill its obligations under this Protocol, each State Party shall
designate or set up a [National Authority] and shall so inform the Organization upon
entry into force of this Protocol for it. The [National Authority ] shall serve as the
national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.
4. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and
administrative measures taken pursuant to this Article.
5. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Protocol,
shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of people and to protect the
environment, and may cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this
regard.
6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of
all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical [Secretariat]
[Body].
